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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jennifer Elaine Shaw appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdict finding her guilty of possession of methamphetamine. On appeal, Shaw 
challenges the denial of her motion to suppress. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On May 26, 2011, during a traffic stop, an officer arrested Shaw on an 
outstanding warrant and for driving with a suspended license. (R., p.99; Tr., 1 
p.6, L.12 - p.11, L.3.) After a drug detection dog exhibited behavior that its 
handler recognized as an alert on the exterior of Shaw's vehicle, officers 
searched the vehicle and found within a black purse several pill bottles, one of 
which contained methamphetamine. (R., pp.99-100; Tr., p.12, L.15 - p.14, L.15, 
p.29, L.10 - p.31, L.23, p.43, L.23 - p.45, L.1.) 
The state charged Shaw with possession of methamphetamine. (R., 
pp.59-60.) Shaw moved to suppress the evidence against her, arguing, inter 
alia, that the drug detection dog did not actually alert on her vehicle and, even if 
it did, the alert was not sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause justifying 
the warrantless search. (R., pp.70-79; Tr., p.60, L.21 - p.57, L.7.) After a 
hearing, the district court denied Shaw's motion, concluding from the evidence 
1 The appellate record contains several separately bound volumes of reporter's 
transcript. All citations herein to "Tr." are to the transcript of the suppression 
hearing conducted on May 2, 2012. 
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presented that a reliable drug detection dog had alerted on Shaw's vehicle and, 
as such, the "warrantless search was constitutionally justifiable." (R., pp.99-101.) 
The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found Shaw guilty as charged. 
(R., pp.102-04, 120.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven 
years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.137-39.) Shaw 
timely appealed from the judgment. (R., pp.133-36.) 
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ISSUES 
Shaw states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the officers lacked probable cause to search the 
vehicle because the canine unit's behavior, considered in 
the totality of the circumstances, was not reliable so as to 
provide such probable cause. 
2. Whether the warrantless search of the closed containers in 
the car was not justified under the inventory exception 
because the State did not prove that the search of those 
containers was conducted pursuant to established policy. 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Shaw failed to establish error in the denial of her suppression motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
Shaw Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of Her Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
Shaw challenges the denial of her motion to suppress, arguing as she did 
below that the drug detection dog did not alert on her vehicle and, even if it did, 
the alert was not sufficiently reliable to supply the officers with probable cause to 
justify the warrantless search of the vehicle. 2 (Appellant's brief, pp.7-12.) 
Shaw's arguments fail. The district court's finding that the drug detection dog 
alerted on Shaw's vehicle is supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
Moreover, correct application of law to the facts found by the district court shows 
the alert was sufficiently reliable to supply the officers with probable cause to 
believe there were drugs in the vehicle, thus justifying the search of the vehicle 
(and the containers therein) without a warrant. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
2 Shaw also argues that the "warrantless search of the closed containers in the 
car was not justified under the inventory exception." (Appellant's brief, p.12 
(capitalization altered, underlining omitted).) Because, for the reasons set forth 
herein, the search of the vehicle was justified under the "automobile exception," 
this Court, like the district court, need not determine whether the evidence Shaw 
sought to suppress would have been inevitably discovered pursuant to an 
inventory search of her vehicle. (See R., p.101.) 
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Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). The credibility of the 
witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be 
drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district 
court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. The District Court's Factual Findings 
The district court made the following, largely uncontested,3 findings of fact 
based on the evidence presented at the suppression hearing: 
On May 26, 2011, Corporal Terry Hodges of the Meridian 
Police Department observed a car driven by the defendant fail to 
signal a lane change so he stopped the car. The car was stopped 
in a lane of traffic near the curb with the driver's side door nearest 
the curb. 
The defendant, who was the sole occupant, identified herself 
as "Jennifer Thornton." A quick check of law enforcement records 
revealed that "Jennifer Thornton" was an alias used by Jennifer 
Elaine Shaw. The same quick check revealed that there was an 
outstanding warrant for Jennifer Shaw for Failure to Obey a 
Citation and that she was driving with a suspended license. Ms. 
Shaw was arrested. 
Cpl. Hodges asked for assistance which showed up in the 
form of a K-9 officer. The K-9 officer, Officer Dan Vogt, had his 
dog walk around the car. The car was a two door car with the 
windows down. The dog, Max, is a Malinois who is a trained drug 
detection dog who has been trained to spot heroin, cocaine, 
marijuana and methamphetamine. 
Officer Vogt trained extensively with Max since they were 
assigned to work together in October, 2010 including forty hours a 
week for two months during initial training. Max was regularly and 
thoroughly trained after the initial intensive training and has given 
possibly one thousand alerts. Max has proven 100% accurate in 
3 Shaw challenges the district court's ultimate factual finding that the drug 
detection dog alerted on her vehicle. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-10.) As explained 
in Section D.1., infra, however, the court's finding is supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. 
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detecting drug odors during his training. Max will alert to both 
drugs and residue remaining on objects that someone who has 
handled drugs has touched. He has alerted at least once in the 
past on masking tape used to secure a package of drugs even 
though human senses were unable to detect the residual presence 
of the drugs. 
Malinois are a herding breed. Max signals his finds primarily 
in two ways: a very intense stare at his handler and by sitting. One 
obvious aspect of the extensive amount of time spent together by 
the dog and his handler is that the handler becomes very adept at 
reading the dog's signals. 
Max signaled at the driver's door of Shaw's vehicle and at 
the gas cap lid on the driver's side of the car. When he signaled at 
the driver's door, he did so by a stare and an indication that he 
wanted inside the vehicle. Officer Vogt had him continue on the 
outside of the driver's side of the car, and Max tried, 
unsuccessfully, to sit immediately when he drew near the gas cap 
lid but, since he was by a grate near the curb, his hind legs fell into 
the grate and he lost his balance and scrambled onto the sidewalk. 
He gave a definite stare signal at both the driver's side door and at 
the gas cap lid. As noted above, the windows were open. Max did 
not enter the car because of the amount of stuff in the car. As a 
result of Max's alerts, the car was searched and a small amount of 
methamphetamine was located in a purse in a pill bottle. 
(R., pp.99-100 (paragraph breaks added for ease of readability).) 
D. The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding 
The Search Of Shaw's Vehicle Was Justified By Probable Cause To 
Believe It Contained Contraband 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 
"A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain 
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. 
Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971 ); see also State v. Ferreira, 133 
Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999).) One such exception is the 
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"automobile exception," which authorizes a warrantless search of a vehicle and 
the containers therein when there is probable cause to believe the vehicle 
contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity. California v. Acevedo, 500 
U.S. 565, 572 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982); State 
v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842, 979 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1999); State v. Yeoumans, 
144 Idaho 871,873, 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Gibson, 141 
Idaho 277, 281, 108 P.3d 424, 428 (Ct. App. 2005). "Probable cause is 
established if the facts available to the officer at the time of the search would 
warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the area or items to be 
searched contained contraband or evidence of a crime." Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 
at 873, 172 P.3d at 1148 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 823; see also Florida v. Harris, 
_ U.S. _, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013). "[W]hen a reliable drug-detection 
dog indicates that a lawfully stopped automobile contains the odor of controlled 
substances, the officer has probable cause to believe that there are drugs in the 
automobile and may search it without a warrant." Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873, 
172 P.3d at 1148 (quoting Gibson, 141 Idaho at 281, 108 P.3d at 428); see also 
Tucker, 132 Idaho at 843, 979 P.2d at 1201. 
Applying the above legal principles to the facts of this case, the district 
court concluded the warrantless search of Shaw's vehicle was constitutionally 
permissible because it was preceded by an alert for the odor of narcotics by a 
reliable drug detection dog. (R., p.101.) Although Shaw argues otherwise, a 
review of the record and of the applicable law supports both the district court's 
factual findings and its ultimate legal conclusion that the search of Shaw's 
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vehicle was supported by probable cause to believe the vehicle contained 
contraband. 
1. Shaw Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court's 
Factual Finding That Max Alerted On Her Vehicle 
As set forth in Section C, supra, the district court found that Officer Vogt's 
drug detection dog, Max, twice "signaled" (i.e., alerted) on the exterior of Shaw's 
vehicle. (R., pp.99-100; see also R., p.101 ("Because of Max's alerts, there was 
probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained drugs and a warrantless 
search was constitutionally justifiable.").) Shaw challenges this factual finding as 
clearly erroneous, contending it was not based on substantial or competent 
evidence. (Appellant's brief, pp.9 n.7, 10.) Shaw is incorrect. A review of the 
evidence presented at the suppression hearing, particularly Officer Vogt's 
testimony, supports the district court's finding that Max "signaled" to the odor of 
narcotics both at the open driver's side window and at the gas cap lid on Shaw's 
vehicle. 
Officer Vogt testified he has worked as a canine officer since October 
2010. (Tr., p.19, L.23 - p.20, L.1..) He and Max trained together for 
approximately 320 hours over a two-month period and were certified as a team 
to detect a variety of controlled substances, including methamphetamine. (Tr., 
p.20, L.2 - p.22, L.20.) Since becoming certified, Officer Vogt and Max have 
engaged in weekly maintenance training. (Tr., p.27, L.24 - p.28, L.1.) They 
have also been deployed for drug detection in the field between 15-30 times per 
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month, with Max alerting to the presence of narcotic odors approximately 1000 
times. (Tr., p.27, L.18 - p.28, L.5.) 
Based on his training and experience with Max, Officer Vogt is able to 
recognize when Max alerts based on distinct changes in Max's behavior. (Tr., 
p.22, L.21 - p.24, L.18, p.35, L.4 - p.36, L.12.) Max does not just smell the drug 
odor and sit. (Tr., p.22, L.21 - p.23, L.3.) Rather, depending on environmental 
factors and how close he can get to the source of the odor, Max exhibits any 
number of behavioral changes - which may include "a tensioning in his body 
posture," a snapping of his head, and the taking of "deep, closed-mouthed sniffs 
through his nose." (Tr., p.23, Ls.1-24.) Officer Vogt testified that, "ultimately, 
[Max] ends up making eye contact with me after I see these body changes. And 
then, when he makes eye contact with me, ... most of the time he will sit." (Tr., 
p.23, L.25 - p.24, L.3.) There have been occasions, however, when Max has 
detected the odor of narcotics but was unable to sit because his footing was poor 
- e.g., when he was inside a vehicle and had "his front feet down on the 
floorboard, [and] his back feet upon on a seat" or was "standing on the console, 
or part of the dash." (Tr., p.24, Ls.4-13.) Officer Vogt testified that, on those 
occasions, "I don't get that final sit response. But I can tell, through his body 
language and through his ... physical cues that he's giving me, followed with that 
intense eye contact that he makes with me, that he's alerted to it, he's gotten as 
close to the source as he can .... " (Tr., p.24, Ls.12-18.) 
Officer Vogt testified that, in this case, Max exhibited behavioral changes 
consistent with an alert to the odor of narcotics at two separate points while 
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sniffing the exterior of Shaw's vehicle. (Tr., p.29, L.15 - p.31, L.23, p.43, L.23 -
p.45, L.1.) The first behavioral change occurred when Max neared the open 
driver's side window of the vehicle. (Tr., p.29, L.21 - p.30, L.19, p.44, Ls.1-4.) 
At that point, Max stopped walking and stared at Officer Vogt. (Tr., p.30, Ls.3-
10, p.44, Ls.1-4.) Based on his training and experience with Max, Officer Vogt 
interpreted that behavior as an indication that Max "smell[ed] [a] narcotic odor 
that he wanted to get closer to." (Tr., p.30, Ls.11-17, p.44, Ls.14-16.) However, 
Max did not display "everything [the officer) wanted to see at that point, as far as 
to be able to say that it positively was an alert, with a final response" (Tr., p.44, 
Ls.16-21); so the officer redirected him to continue sniffing the exterior of the 
vehicle (Tr., p.30, Ls.18-21.) When Max reached the door to the gas tank, which 
was also on the driver's side of the vehicle, he "sniffed it with tense body 
posture," "took some deep sniffs at that gas door," and "made intense eye 
contact with" the officer. (Tr., p.30, L.21 - p.31, L.10.) Max then attempted to sit 
but was unable to do so because "his feet fell through the storm drain that he 
was standing on." (Tr., p.31, Ls.8-19.) Based on his training and experience 
with Max, Officer Vogt recognized Max's change in behavior at the gas door, 
coupled with his attempt to sit, "as an alert to narcotics odor." (Tr., p.31, Ls.21-
23, p.44, L.22 - p.45, L.1.) 
Officer Vogt's testimony clearly supports the district court's factual finding 
that Max twice "signaled" on the exterior of Shaw's vehicle. In arguing otherwise 
and contending, "the evidence is not clear that the dog was trying to alert at all" 
(Appellant's brief, p.10), Shaw merely substitutes her own interpretation of Max's 
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behavior for that of the officer who spent hundreds of hours training with Max, 
who has responded with Max on 15-30 drug detection deployments per month, 
who has personally witnessed Max alert approximately 1000 times in the field 
and who is otherwise uniquely qualified, as Max's assigned handler since 
October 2010, to recognize Max's alert behavior. That Shaw would not have 
interpreted Max's behavior, at either the driver's side window or the gas tank 
door, as an indication that Max smelled the odor of narcotics is irrelevant. Officer 
Vogt testified, unambiguously, that Max alerted at the gas tank door and also 
exhibited behavior consistent with an alert at the driver's side window. Shaw has 
therefore failed to show clear error in the district court's factual finding, based on 
Officer Vogt's testimony, that Max alerted on her vehicle. 
2. Correct Application Of The Law To The Facts Found By The 
District Court Shows The Alert Was Sufficiently Reliable To Supply 
The Officers With Probable Cause To Believe There Were Drugs 
In The Vehicle 
The Supreme Court of the United States has, very recently, articulated the 
appropriate test for determining whether an alert by a trained drug-detection dog 
is sufficiently reliable to provide the probable cause necessary to justify the 
warrantless search of a vehicle. See Florida v. Harris, U.S. , 133 S.Ct. 
- - -
1050 (2013). Like any other probable cause determination, "a finding of a drug-
detection dog's reliability cannot depend on the State's satisfaction of multiple, 
independent evidentiary requirements." kl at _, 133 S.Ct. at 1056. Rather, 
"[a] sniff is up to snuff' when "all the facts surrounding a dog's alert, viewed 
through the lens of common sense, would make a reasonably prudent person 
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think that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime." kl. at_, 
133 S.Ct. at 1058. 
One good measurement of a drug detection dog's reliability is its 
"satisfactory performance in a certification or training program." kl. at_, 133 
S.Ct. at 1057. "If a bona fide organization has certified a dog after testing his 
reliability in a controlled setting, a court can presume (subject to any conflicting 
evidence offered) that the dog's alert provides probable cause to search." kl. A 
defendant may challenge a dog's general reliability in a number of ways, 
including by contesting the adequacy of the training or certification program, 
examining how the dog or handler performed in the program, or offering 
evidence of the dog's or handler's previous performance in the field. 4 kl. "Even 
assuming a dog is generally reliable, circumstances surrounding a particular alert 
may undermine the case for probable cause" - e.g., if the handler "cued the dog 
(consciously or not), or if the team was working under unfamiliar conditions." kl. 
at_, 133 S.Ct. at 1057-58. If a defendant does "challenge[] the State's case 
(by disputing the reliability of the dog overall or of a particular alert)," the court 
must "weigh the competing evidence" and determine whether, under all the 
circumstances, the dog's alert "would make a reasonably prudent person think 
4 The Harris Court observed, however, that, in most cases, field performance is 
not an accurate measure of a dog's reliability. Harris,_ U.S. at_, 133 S.Ct. 
at 1056-57 (footnote omitted) (observing that field data will usually not reflect a 
dog's false negatives and "may markedly overstate a dog's real false positives" 
because, in many instances, the "dog may not have made a mistake at all" but 
"may have detected substances that were too well hidden or present in quantities 
too small for the officer to locate," or "may have smelled the residual odor of 
drugs previously in the vehicle or on the driver's person"). 
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that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime." Id. at _, 133 
S.Ct. at 1058. 
Application of these legal principles to the facts found by the district court 
in this case shows Max's alert was sufficiently reliable to supply the officers with 
probable cause to believe there were drugs in Shaw's vehicle. The district court 
made the following uncontested factual findings with regard to Max's training 
record: 
Officer Vogt trained extensively with Max since they were assigned 
to work together in October, 2010 including forty hours a week for 
two months during the initial training. Max was regularly and 
thoroughly trained after the initial intrusive training and has given 
possibly one thousand alerts. Max has proven 100% accurate in 
detecting drug odors during his training. 
(R., p.100.) "Viewed alone, that training record ... sufficed to establish [Max's] 
reliability." Harris,_ U.S. at_, 133 S.Ct. at 1058. And, contrary to Shaw's 
assertions on appeal, nothing about the "particular circumstances of this case" or 
Max's record in the field served to undermine the presumption of reliability 
established by Max's certification and record of satisfactory performance in 
controlled settings. 
As she did below, Shaw contends on appeal that Max's alert was not 
reliable because "the dog did not alert where any odor emanating from the 
vehicle was likely to be the strongest: the open front window" and, instead, 
alerted at the back of the vehicle, despite a tail-wind and despite the fact that no 
drugs were actually found at the back of the car. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-10.) As 
found by the district court, however, Max did "signal" at the open front window in 
a manner that indicated to his handler that he smelled the odor of a controlled 
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substance. (R., p.100; see also Tr., p.30, Ls.3-19, p.44, Ls.1-21.) While Max did 
not give or attempt to give a "final sit response" at the open front window, his 
behavior there - nearest to where the drugs were actually found - only added to, 
not detracted from, the totality of the circumstances supporting his reliability. 
Moreover, that Max ultimately alerted at the back of the car, where the 
wind was blowing forward and no drugs were found - does not demonstrate the 
alert was unreliable. Officer Vogt testified, and the district court found, that Max 
was trained to detect the odor of controlled substances, not the controlled 
substances themselves, and, as such, may have been responding to residual 
drug odors. (R., p.100; Tr., p.36, L.13 - p.45, L.3 - p.47, L.11.) As noted by the 
Supreme Court in Harris, "[a] well-trained drug-detection dog should alert to such 
odors; his response to them might appear a mistake, but in fact is not." Harris, 
_ U.S. at_, 133 S.Ct. at 1059 (emphasis original) (citing footnote 2 of the 
opinion in which the Court explained: "A detection dog recognizes an odor, not a 
drug, and should alert whenever the scent is present, even if the substance is 
gone .... "). It does not matter that, in hindsight, no drugs were located at or near 
the gas tank lid; where, as here, a well-trained dog alerts on a location such alert 
"establishes a fair probability - all that is required for probable cause - that either 
drugs or evidence of a drug crime ... will be found." ~ at 1056-57 n.2 
In an attempt to discredit Max's reliability in general, Shaw points to Max's 
record of accuracy in the field, noting Officer Vogt's testimony that Max alerts 
"fairly frequently" when drugs are not present. (Appellant's brief, p.11 (citing Tr., 
p.36, L.24 - p.37, L.2).) Because, as explained above, drug detection dogs are 
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trained to detect the odor of controlled substances, not the controlled substances 
themselves, the Supreme Court has determined that records of a dog's field 
performance are of "relatively limited import" in determining the dog's reliability. 
kl at _, 133 S.Ct. at 1056-57. Instead, the "better measure of a dog's 
reliability ... comes away from the field, in controlled testing environments" where 
the "designers of an assessment know where drugs are hidden and where they 
are not - and so where a dog should alert and where he should not." kl at_, 
133 S.Ct. at 1057. Here, Officer Vogt testified, and the district court found, that 
Max has a 100% accuracy record in his training and certification assessments. 
(R., p.100, Tr., p.37, Ls.11-17.) Given that record, Max enjoys a presumption of 
reliability. kl 
In a final attempt to discredit Max's reliability, Shaw contests the adequacy 
of his training. Specifically, she contends "there is no evidence that suggests 
Max was trained to do anything except sniff where Officer Vogt directed him to 
sniff and then look to the officer to get his reward." (Appellant's brief, p.11.) To 
support this assertion, Shaw cites only the portion of the transcript wherein 
Officer Vogt testified Max was initially trained to detect the odor of controlled 
substances in scent boxes. She completely ignores the officer's subsequent 
testimony that, after the dogs, including Max, got "used to being exposed to the 
odor on that box," the handlers "move[d] the odors" to different locations - such 
as buildings, vehicles, trees, etc. - "to expose the dogs to any type of scenario 
that we could come up with to where they have to search and find narcotic 
odors." (Tr., p.22, Ls.8-15 (emphasis added).) Shaw has failed to demonstrate 
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from the record any deficiency in Max's training and certification or his ability, 
without being cued, to reliably detect the odor of controlled substances. 
Because Max's training record established his reliability in detecting the 
odor of controlled substances, and because Shaw failed to identify any evidence 
either below or on appeal that would undermine that reliability, the district court 
correctly concluded that Max's alert provided the officers with probable cause to 
search Shaw's vehicle. See Harris,_ U.S. at_, 133 S.Ct. at 1059. Shaw 
has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the denial of her suppression 
motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment and the 
district court's order denying Shaw's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 1 ih day of June 2013. 
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